Comparing redistributive efficiency of tax-benefit systems in Europe by Mantovani, Daniela
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EM 12/18 
 
Comparing redistributive efficiency of 
tax-benefit systems in Europe 
 
Daniela Mantovani 
 
June 2018 
Comparing redistributive efficiency of tax-benefit systems  
in Europe*  
 
Daniela Mantovani 
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia  
 
Abstract 
In empirical analysis, the Kakwani index is the most frequently used indicator for 
comparing progressivity across countries and over time. The Kakwani is often assumed 
to measure to what extent a policy design is targeted to the poor. It has, however, a major 
drawback: it is not defined for net tax incidence—that is, the whole system of taxes and 
benefits. Moreover, it is defined over different intervals for different pre-tax income 
distributions and different average tax rates. This paper proposes an extension to Kakwani 
index based on the concept of relative redistributive efficiency that is not affected by these 
drawbacks. The Redistributive Efficiency index was compared to the Kakwani index for 
taxes/benefits in EU countries by using Euromod baselines. In addition, the Redistributive 
Efficiency index was computed on the whole tax-benefit system; that is, taxes and 
benefits were evaluated together. Only Ireland and the UK combine high levels of 
redistributive efficiency with a relevant amount of tax revenues and social expenditures. 
They obviously obtain very high redistribution, above 15 points. Most of the countries 
considered show an intermediate level of redistribution (between 7 and 12 points), but 
with a different mix. A group of Central and Northern European countries plus Slovenia 
and Hungary combine medium levels of redistributive efficiency and medium size, while 
some Southern European countries (Spain and Portugal) and new members compensate 
a rather low amount of transfer and taxes with quite high levels of efficiency. The 
remaining new member states and Southern EU countries show a very low level of 
redistribution, below 7 points. Interestingly, they vary in the level of tax burden and of 
resources devoted to benefits but all of them show a poor Redistributive Efficiency. This 
suggests that low Redistributive Efficiency plays a key role in explaining why certain 
countries perform a limited amount of redistribution. 
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Introduction and main conclusions 
 
Did the new policy adopted by the government disproportionally harm the poor? Could the alternative 
reform recently proposed reduce the loss for low income families? Such questions are inevitable in times of 
widening market inequality, shrinking welfare expenditures and policies of budget consolidation. Reducing 
resources for welfare also reduces the equalizing impact of fiscal policies, but two reforms with the same 
impact on the public budget may have a very different effect on income distribution. Whether and to what 
degree public resources are used efficiently in reducing inequality has become a commonplace subject of 
political debate in the last decades and it has been a central point of academic researches on inequality for 
a much longer time. 
Academic researchers have dealt with this issue in order to answer a variety of research questions. A 
number of studies have investigated whether certain types of welfare regimes are more selective than 
others (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996). In doing that, researchers have mainly used a qualitative 
description of tax-benefit systems, for example the extent to which means testing has been used. Other 
authors focused on whether tax-benefit systems providing more resources to those at the bottom of the 
income distribution (instead of spreading them more evenly among the general population) are likely to 
have a higher equalizing impact (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Nelson, 2004; Marx et al., 2013). The measure they 
used to quantify how much a benefit is targeted to the poor was the concentration index of the benefit in 
question. A huge number of studies have analysed the role of progressivity of policy instruments in 
reducing income inequality. In this case it is not possible to give a complete report of the instruments used 
because of the very large number of papers written on the subject, but certainly the indices most 
commonly used to measure progressivity are the Kakwani (1976, 1977) and the Suits (1977). 
The object of all these studies has not been just to examine the redistributive effectiveness of policies, but 
also the role played specifically by policy design—how efficiently do redistributive policies reduce income 
inequality? Though the idea of redistributive efficiency has been frequently hinted at, no researchers have 
explicitly referred to such a concept, as far as I know1. Indeed, the role of policy design in redistribution has 
been examined with a number of different tools, none of which is suitable to quantify redistributive 
efficiency.  Extensive recourse to means testing is not the only way to design a highly redistributive benefit. 
Transfers can also be focused on the poor by using an appropriate targeting system. On the other hand a 
means testing system with very high income thresholds might be almost completely ineffective in excluding 
the rich from state transfers.  
The reason why a qualitative description of how common means testing is in a benefit system is not a good 
enough measure of redistributive efficiency is rather intuitive, but the reason that statistical quantitative 
methods (such as concentration index and progressivity indices) are also not suitable is more complex to 
explain. The concentration index reaches the maximum value if the tax is entirely paid by the richest 
individual; conversely, it reaches its minimum if the whole amount of benefits is given to the poorest one. 
In fact, if total tax amount is sufficiently small, making the richest individual pay the entire burden will 
result in the most equalizing impact on income distribution. As the average tax rate increases, however, 
concentrating the tax on just one individual will not lead to the maximum equalizing impact; on the 
contrary, it could even worsen income distribution by reducing the post-tax income of the richest person 
below the income of the second richest person, as the tax becomes greater than the income gap between 
them. As the tax rate increases still further, the net income of the richest person will fall below the third 
richest one, and so on. To avoid richer taxpayers moving down in income ranking (re-ranking) as an effect 
                                                          
1The term “redistributive efficiency” actually, has already been used by D. Coady and E. Skoufias (2004), but with a different 
meaning. They studied the impact of targeting benefits on the poor. 
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of tax burden, real taxes are designed with effective marginal rates lower than 100%. Because of the upper 
limit of marginal tax rates, increasingly high tax revenue can be obtained only by sharing tax burden among 
an increasingly large number of taxpayers, making people less and less rich pay taxes2. In conclusion, an 
important consequence of assuming marginal rates lower than 100% is that in reality the upper (maximum) 
limit of the concentration index of a tax decreases as tax revenue increases. It may happen that even the 
most redistributive very high tax could have a smaller concentration index than a not very redistributive 
little tax. Therefore, comparison of such indices is a redistributive efficiency evaluation if only same-size 
taxes are involved. Similar conclusions can be reached for the concentration index applied to benefits. 
Even if we were dealing with taxes and benefits of the same size there would be an additional major 
problem with the concentration index. It is not defined for net tax, wherein a whole tax-benefit system is 
considered. This was not an important issue in the past, when microdata on taxes were scant and data on 
benefits virtually non-existent. But it is a relevant limitation now, when large sets of microdata on 
household incomes, benefits and taxes are available; nowadays redistributive analyses on whole tax-
benefits systems have become relatively common3  
The Kakwani index has been used even more than the concentration index. The Kakwani measures 
progressivity as departure from proportionality. It is defined as the difference between the concentration 
index of the tax and the Gini index of income before tax; it shares with the concentration index both the 
mentioned problems: the upper limit changes with the tax size and it is not defined for net fiscal incidence.  
In this paper an intuitive extension to Kakwani index (and to the Reynold-Smolensky) based on the concept 
of relative redistributive efficiency is proposed. The simple starting point is the scaling of Reynold-
Smolensky index (and Kakwani index) according to the tax size; so that the resulting Redistributive efficiency 
index proposed here, has fixed limits regardless of the tax size, from 0 (minimum efficiency) to 1 (maximum 
efficiency). Furthermore it is decomposable into efficiency of single policy instruments and it allows 
decomposing redistributive impact into two components: redistributive efficiency and a component that 
depends only on market income distribution and policy instrument size. 
The paper is organized as follows: Part 1 will describe the limits of the Kakwani index and will introduce the 
concept of maximum redistribution. Part 2 will describe the new index of redistributive efficiency. Part 3 
will present the index applied to compare redistributive efficiency in EU countries. 
Some previous findings on tax benefit systems based on the Kakwani and concentration index will be re-
examined to find out if they still hold with the redistributive efficiency index.  
Our results do not show any correlation between average tax rate and redistributive efficiency. This 
suggests that previous findings of a negative relationship between the average rate and the Kakwani 
(Verbist and Figari 2014) relied on the dependence of the Kakwani’s upper limit on tax size. 
I found that both the Kakwani and the redistributive efficiency index of benefits are positively related to 
redistributive impact. 
The redistributive efficiency index has been computed for the whole tax benefit systems (considering taxes 
and benefits together) for 27 EU countries. Three groups have been identified. A first group of countries 
has a significant amount of resources devoted to redistribution and high redistributive efficiency; as 
expected, these countries show a high level of redistribution. In the middle, there are several countries 
with a moderate level of redistribution; some of them show rather high redistributive efficiency, others a 
moderate degree of efficiency. Finally, there is a group of countries with a low level of redistribution. Some 
of these countries employ a significant amount of resources for welfare, while others devote much less to 
                                                          
2 On the very same intuition is based the discussion on Kakwani maximum value carried out by Pellegrino et al. (2017). 
3 In fact there are too many researches to give an exhaustive list. It worth mentioning, among others: Immervoll et al. (2006), OECD 
(2008), OECD (2011), Immervoll, H. and L. Richardson (2011), Avram at al. (2014). 
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welfare, but all of them show a very low value of redistributive efficiency. Indeed, the lower tail of the 
redistributive efficiency distribution is entirely made up of these underperforming countries. This suggests 
that low redistributive efficiency plays a key role in explaining why certain countries perform a very limited 
amount of redistribution. 
 
 
1. BACKGROUND  
 
 
Progressivity of net fiscal incidence 
 
For the sake of simplicity, in the following, only one global measure of redistribution (proposed by Reynold 
and Smolensky in 1977) and the Kakwani progressivity index will be discussed, but most of the conclusions 
apply also to other ATR progressivity indices (Pfaehler, 1987), such as the Suits (1977).  
The Reynold-Smolensky index (𝑅𝑆) is the most commonly used index of redistribution. A description of 
progressivity indices is beyond the scope of this paper, where only a few essential concepts will be 
mentioned. A general description of different sorts of indices and an exhaustive analysis of progression 
indicators within Lorenz’s dominance framework is provided by Lambert (2001) and by Seidl et al. (2013). 
The Reynold-Smolensky index (𝑅𝑆 ) measures redistribution as the difference between the Gini index of 
income before tax (GY+T) and the Concentration index of disposable income (CY), ordered by income before 
tax. 
 
1.1. 𝑇
𝑅𝑆= GY+T –CY        𝑇
𝑅𝑆  ≤GY+T  
 
In sections 1 and 2 I assume absence of re-ranking, that is, the ordering of persons according to income 
before and after tax is the same. In this case the concentration (CY) and the Gini index of income after tax 
coincide.  
 
Reynolds-Smolensky for total tax is decomposable into single components: 
 
1.1𝑎 𝑇
𝑅𝑆 =   ∑
(1−𝑡𝑖)𝑡𝑖
𝑅𝑆
(1−𝑡)
          
 
Where 𝑡𝑖 is the average tax rate of the single tax  "𝑖"  and 𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑡𝑖. 
 
Kakwani (1976, 1977) showed that 𝑇
𝑅𝑆 can be decomposed into other two components: 
 
1.2. 𝑇
𝑅𝑆= 
𝑡
(1−𝑡)
*(CT – GY+T ) 
 
Where CT is the coefficient of concentration of tax (ordered by income before tax) and t is average tax rate4. 
I refer to the first component (
𝑡
(1−𝑡)
) as “rate effect” and to the second one as “progressivity as departure 
from proportionality” or Kakwani index (𝑇
𝐾)5: 
                                                          
4 Average tax rate is defined as total tax revenue divided by total taxable income. 
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1.3. 𝑇
𝐾= (CT –GY+T)     1.3𝑎 − (1 + 𝐺𝑌+𝑇) < 𝑇
𝐾
< (1 − 𝐺𝑌+𝑇)  
 
The Kakwani index (𝑇
𝐾) provides a measures of progressivity as departure from proportionality. It 
compares the tax under examination with a yield equivalent fictional tax scheme whose equalizing impact 
is known in advance. Specifically, the reference hypothetical tax scheme is a proportional tax whose 
redistributive impact is always zero. The concentration index of a proportional tax has exactly the same 
value of the concentration index of the tax base; therefore, 𝑇
𝐾 may be interpreted as the distance of 
distributive effect of a tax (T ) from the (non) distributive impact of a proportional tax of the same size (of 
any size, actually). The concept of departure from proportionality is discussed in depth in Lambert (2011, 
pp. 199-204). 
The reason for the appeal of decomposition 1.2 is easy to explain. Tax systems typically differ in design and 
in size; the decomposition is thought to allow one to distinguish the impact due to each of the components: 
the rate effect depends on total revenue (the size), while in empirical analysis the Kakwani index is often 
used to measure the effect of tax design, independently from amounts involved. 
Kakwani (1977) also showed that 𝑇
𝐾 can be decomposed into single tax components (𝑇𝑖
𝐾 ): 
 
1.4. 𝑇
𝐾=  ti/t*𝑇𝑖
𝐾  
 
Where (
𝑡𝑖
 𝑡    
)  is the share of the single tax Ti on total tax revenue 
Redistributive impact of benefits is measured in a similar way, but benefits, unlike taxes, are equalizing if 
they are disproportionally in favour of the poor. Technically, benefits have an equalizing impact if they are 
regressive. That is benefits are equalizing if they have a negative Kakwani index. Apart from the sign, 
redistribution and progressivity of tax and benefits are measured in a similar way. Specifically, the 
Reynolds-Smolensky index may also be decomposed into rate effect and progressivity as departure from 
proportionality for benefits: 
 
1.2.b) 𝐵
𝑅𝑆=(𝐺𝑌−𝐵- CY) =  
−𝑏
(1+𝑏)
*(CB–GY-B) = 
−𝑏
(1+𝑏)
∗ 𝐵
𝐾 
 
Where b is the ratio of benefits on income, CB is the coefficient of concentration of benefits (ordered by 
incomes before benefits GY-B), 𝐵
𝑅𝑆is the redistributive impact of benefits (Reynolds-Smolensky index) and 
𝐵
𝐾 the Kakwani of benefits. 
The matter is more troublesome if one puts together taxes and benefits and tries to evaluate progressivity 
of the whole tax-benefit system. Following Lambert (2001, ch. 11) I define net taxes (TN) as the difference 
between the taxes paid and the benefits received by each individual k: 
 
1.5. TNk = Tk – Bk 
 
Then redistributive impact of net tax is defined as: 
 
1.6.𝑁
𝑅𝑆= GY+T-B –GY  =  
(1−𝑔)𝑇
𝑅𝑆+ (1+𝑏)𝐵
𝑅𝑆 
(1−𝑡+𝑏)
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
5 Pfähler(1987) shows that a similar decomposition applies also to every other scale invariant redistribution index, which satisfy 
Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, such as Suits index.  
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The Kakwani index, instead, is not defined because it is not possible to compute the concentration index of 
TN. TNk assumes a negative value if the benefits received exceed the taxes paid by the individual k. For this 
reason, the concentration curve (and therefore concentration index) of TNi is not “well behaved”: it may 
assume values bigger than 1 and lower than 0 (Lambert, 2001, p 276). Even neglecting this issue, it is 
possible to show that the Kakwani index does not work in the case of net tax. A progressivity index for net 
tax can be constructed, by using (1.4.), as the weighted sum of 𝐵
𝐾 and 𝑇
𝐾: 
 
1.7.𝑁
𝐾= 
𝑡𝑇
𝐾−𝑏𝐵
𝐾
𝑡−𝑏
 
 
The obvious problem here is that 𝑁
𝐾 → ∞ as b approaches t (Lambert, 2001; Kiefer, 1984)6. 
The conclusion is that the Kakwani index does not enable one to evaluate progressivity when taxes and 
benefits are both taken in account simultaneously. This is a severe weakness since progressivity of pure 
transfers, of negative income taxes and of complete tax-benefit systems cannot be assessed by using 
Kakwani index. 
 
 
The Maximum Redistribution and the effective Kakwani upper limit.  
 
A well-known inconvenient feature of the Kakwani is that upper and lower limits are not fixed, but depend 
on pre-tax income distribution. The Kakwani index ranges from -(1+GY+T), corresponding to maximum 
regressivity, to (1 -GY+T), maximum progressivity.  
A closer look highlights that the question is even more complex. An easy way to provide a glimpse of the 
issue is to show that equation 1.2 does not hold for the whole Kakwani’s (theoretical) range. Substituting 
the theoretical maximum Kakwani in 1.2 we obtain:  
 
𝑇
𝑅𝑆= 
𝑡
(1−𝑡)
*(1– GY+T ) 
 
If 𝑡 > 𝐺𝑌+𝑇 then 𝑇
𝑅𝑆 > 𝐺𝑌+𝑇 ,  this violates the condition (1.1) 𝑇
𝑅𝑆 ≤ 𝐺𝑌+𝑇 and implies CY < 0; in other 
words, the concentration curve of incomes after tax lies above the line of perfect distribution. The violation 
of this condition implies that individuals are ranked differently according to pre tax and disposable income. 
The richest persons according to income before tax become the poorest after tax; this is called re-ranking. 
This extreme example makes clear that in real tax-benefit systems there must be some condition that 
avoids re-ranking and in doing that affects the actual limit of Kakwani. This condition is that effective 
marginal rates must be lower than 100%. Indeed, It is possible to show that, for any given average tax rate, 
there is a single tax design that ensures the maximum redistribution. Therefore, with that tax design we 
have the maximum values of the Reynolds-Smolensky index; any tax design that results in a higher Kakwani 
index implies some re-ranking and a lower Reynolds-Smolensky. 
For a given average tax rate t-and for a given distribution of income before tax, the maximum redistribution 
is provided by a flat rate tax (TMR) with personal allowance (A) and a nominal tax rate equal to 100% (Fig. 
1a) 
                                                          
6 A similar problem arises with Suits index (Lambert 2001). Unlike for the Kakwani, for Suits index  ad hoc solutions for this problem 
were propose by Kienzle E.C.(1981, 1982) and Bridges B. (1984) 
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1.8aTMRk   =  (Yk –A)    if    Yk  > = A   ;  TMRk  =  0   otherwise. 
1.8b YMRTk   =  A    if   Yk  > = A   ; YMRTk   =  Yk  otherwise 
 
Where YMRT  is post-tax income. 
It may be shown that any other tax design involves a post-tax income distribution more unequal than YMRT, 
in terms of the Gini index.  I assume that the taxes being compared all have the same (total) amount, so 
that any after-tax income resulting from (any) tax different from TMR can be reproduced starting from YMRT 
and carrying out transfers from one individual to another. A transfer from individual A to individual B 
means a higher tax paid by A and a lower tax paid by B. The impacts of all possible transfers are shown in 
Fig. 1. I assume 𝑇𝐾 ≥ 0, and therefore a transfer to non-taxpayers (Fig. 1b) is not allowed, because non-
taxpayers would end up with a post-tax income bigger than their pre-tax one—they would receive benefits 
instead of paying taxes.  
 
Fig. 1 The Most Redistributive Tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transfers from (pre-tax income) richer taxpayers to poorer ones (Fig. 1c) are allowed and they produce an 
increase of post-tax income inequality due to re-ranking, since as a result of TMR  all taxpayers have the 
same post-tax income equal to A (Fig. 1a). Only one additional type of transfers is possible: from non-tax 
payers (and poor tax payers) to (richer) taxpayers (Fig. 1d); it does do not necessarily involve re-ranking, 
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but it is a transfer from the poor to the rich. The Gini index respects the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and 
therefore the latter type of transfer leads to a more unequal post-tax income distribution.  
A nice feature of the Most Redistributive Tax (TMR) is that it can be computed with simple microsimulation 
techniques and using the same microdata necessary to compute the Reynols-Smolensky and the Kakwani: 
total value of tax under examination and individual value of income before tax. Then also the Reynolds-
Smolensky index 
  
( 𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆
) and Kakwani index (𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝐾 ) corresponding to maximum redistribution can be 
computed using the same data: 
 
1.9a. 𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆 = (𝐺𝑌+𝑇 −  𝐺𝑌+𝑇−𝑇𝑀𝑅) =  
𝑡
(1−𝑡)
 𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝐾                
1.9b 𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝐾 = (𝐶𝑇𝑀𝑅 − 𝐺𝑌+𝑇) 
 
Where 𝐶𝑇𝑀𝑅 is the concentration index of TMR. Note that TMR  is paid entirely by the richest individual only if 
the average tax rate is implausibly low; the value of 𝐶𝑇𝑀𝑅 is typically lower than 1 and 𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝐾 <(1-GY+T).  
For most of the reasonably big taxes, the Kakwani index corresponding to the maximum redistribution is 
lower than its theoretical maximum (1-GY+T). An increase of the Kakwani index beyond 𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝐾  would lead to 
a reduction of redistribution because this is possible only in presence of marginal tax rates bigger than 
100% and re-ranking. 
I have shown that though the Kakwani upper limit presented in 1.3a could hold for the Kakwani index in 
general, if the Kakwani is applied to a tax it is necessary to either limit the effective upper bound to 𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝐾  or 
give up to the condition of marginal tax rates not bigger that 100%. In the latter case, redistribution is not 
monotonically non-decreasing with the Kakwani. It goes without saying that the condition on marginal tax 
rates is essential for any sensible discussion on taxes and benefits and it will be maintained in the 
following7.  
I will proceed with the analysis of the properties of  𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝐾  and  𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆 . 
Given that the only tax rate of TMR is fixed at 100%, total tax amount changes only if tax allowance is 
modified: an increase of tax allowance reduces tax revenue and a reduction of tax allowance increases it. 
The impact of changes of tax allowances on progressivity as departure from proportionality and 
redistribution has been studied by Keen et al. (2000). They found that if the tax schedule is proportional (as 
in our case), an increase of allowance (namely a reduction of average tax rate) leads to an increase in the 
Kakwani index and a decrease in the Reynolds-Smolensky index. This provides a more rigorous proof of the 
dependency of Kakwani limit on average tax rate and the conclusion is that the effective upper limit of the 
Kakwani  (𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝐾 ) decreases as average tax rate (t) increases. 
The reasoning applied to the Kakwani for taxes can be extended to benefits with only small adaptations.The 
most distributive scheme can be identified for benefits as well. For a given total amount of benefit, the 
maximum redistribution (
𝑀𝑅𝐵
𝑅𝑆 ) is provided by a Minimum income scheme (BMR) with income limit (B) 
and 100% withdrawal rate. 
 
BMRk   = (B –Yk)   if    Yk  < = B   ;  BMRk  = 0   otherwise. 
YMRBk  = B    if   Yk < = B   ; YMRBk   = Yk  otherwise 
                                                          
7 This is not to say that effective marginal rates bigger that 100% are completely unseen in real tax-benefit systems. Discontinuities 
and incomes subjected to more than one tax (or social contribution) occasionally do cause effective marginal rates bigger than 
100%. More frequently, re-ranking is due to the treatment of non-income characteristics, such as the presence of income 
dependents in the family. This latter case concerns horizontal equality rather than vertical equality, and must be studied with 
different tools. 
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Where YMRB  is post-benefit income. A line of reasoning similar to the one applied to the most distributive 
tax can be used for the most redistributive benefit (BMR). Similarly to taxes, it may be shown that for any 
benefit scheme involving the same amount of resources as BMR, after-benefit income can be reproduced 
starting from YMRB and performing a pure transfer. A transfer from individual A to individual B leads to a 
smaller benefit to individual A and a bigger transfer to individual B. Any transfer from a non-beneficiary is 
not allowed because it involves negative benefits (that is they would pay taxes instead of receiving 
benefits). Transfers from less poor (in pre-benefit income) beneficiaries to the poorer would lead to re-
ranking and to a more unequal income distribution. Transfers from poorer beneficiaries to other 
beneficiaries lead directly to a more unequal income distribution. 
Symmetrically to taxes, the most distributive benefit (BMR) is less regressive than the Kakwani lower limit, 
that is  𝑀𝑅𝐵
𝐾  >-(1+GY-B). Moreover (BMR) becomes less regressive as total benefit amount increases, the 
Kakwani of the most distributive benefit (𝑀𝑅𝐵
𝐾 ) is increasing with benefit average rate (b). Unlike for 
taxes, however, there is not any previous research on a general relationship between benefit progression 
and income limits; for this reason a simple proof is provided in Appendix 1, where the dependence of 𝑀𝑅𝐵
𝐾  
on income limit (B) is discussed. 
 
 
2. REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFICIENCY INDEX 
 
The objective of this part is to develop an index of Redistributive Efficiency (𝐸 ) without the flaws 
previously seen for the Kakwani index. The Redistributive Efficiency index is defined for net tax; it is 
monotonically increasing with equalizing impact of the tax, the benefit and the net tax. 
The simple starting idea is based on a change of benchmark. Redistributive Efficiency (𝐸 ) compares the 
observed redistribution to the redistribution produced by the most distributive tax (or the most distributive 
benefit) of the same size of the tax (benefit) under examination, rather than measuring progressivity as 
departure from proportionality.  
While the Kakwani is the distance between concentration index of the actual tax and the concentration 
index of a hypothetical proportional tax, the redistributive efficiency index uses the most distributive tax as 
the counterfactual tax.  
Progressivity as departure from proportionality does not need the actual computation of the counterfactual 
equally yield proportional tax (benefit), since all proportional taxes and benefits have the same Kakwani 
and Reinolds-Smolensky value, zero. Unlike proportional taxes and benefits, the concentration index of the 
most distributive tax (benefit) depends on average tax (benefit) rate; for this reason TMR (BMR) must be 
really simulated. Once TMR and BMR are simulated, the corresponding Reynolds-Smolensky redistributive 
indices 𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆  and  𝑀𝑅𝐵
𝑅𝑆  can be computed as: 
 
2.1.a 𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆 = (𝐺𝑌+𝑇 −  𝐺𝑌+𝑇−𝑇𝑀𝑅) 
2.1.b 𝑀𝑅𝐵
𝑅𝑆 = (𝐺𝑌−𝐵 −  𝐺𝑌−𝐵+𝐵𝑀𝑅) 
Then the Redistributive Efficiency index can be computed as the ratio between the actual redistribution 
and the maximum attainable with the same amount of resources: 
 
2.2a 𝑇
𝐸 =  
𝑇
𝑅𝑆
𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆        0 ≤ 𝑇
𝐸 ≤ 1 
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2.2b 𝐵
𝐸 =  
𝐵
𝑅𝑆
𝑀𝑅𝐵
𝑅𝑆        0 ≤ 𝐵
𝐸 ≤ 1 
 
Redistributive Efficiency has a number of noticeable properties. For simplicity, in the following they will be 
presented for 𝑇
𝐸 only, since the generalization to 𝐵 
𝐸  is straightforward.  
First, an attractive feature is that 𝑇
𝐸 has fixed bounds; it ranges from 0, in case of proportionality, to 1 if 
redistributive impact of the tax or benefit matches the most redistributive one.  
Second, Redistributive Efficiency is also equal to the ratio between the actual Kakwani and the Kakwani of 
the most distributive tax. 
Using 1.2 for substituting 𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆  and 𝑇
𝑅𝑆 in 2.2a yields: 
 
2.3 𝑇
𝐸 =  
𝑇
𝑅𝑆
𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆 =  
𝑇
𝐾
𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝐾  
 
Third, similarly to the decomposition into rate effect and Kakwani, this framework allows a decomposition 
of the Reynolds-Smolensky index into two components due respectively to the amount of resources 
employed and the tax design: 
 
2.4 𝑇
𝑅𝑆 =  𝑇
𝐸𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆    
 
Where𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆 , the maximum redistribution, depends only on tax amount and pre-tax income distribution 
and 𝑇
𝐸 , redistributive efficiency, depends on tax design. 
 
Finally, 𝑇
𝐸 is decomposable into contribution of single components. Using the 1.1a decomposition for 𝑇
𝑅𝑆 
yields: 
2.5 𝑇
𝐸 =  ∑
(1−𝑡𝑖)
(1−𝑡)
𝑡𝑖
𝐸  
𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑖
𝑅𝑆  
𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆  
 
where 𝑡𝑖
𝐸 is the Redistributive Efficiency of tax 𝑖 and 𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑖
𝑅𝑆  is the Reynolds-Smolensky of the most 
redistributive tax with the same size of tax 𝑖. 
 
 
Redistributive Efficiency, amount of resources and net fiscal system 
 
Progressivity as departure from proportionality is usually interpreted as a comparison between 
concentration indices of the actual tax/benefit and the concentration index of equal-yield proportional 
ones. It may look like computation of the Kakwani really involves a comparison with a counterfactual tax of 
the same amount as the one under examination. But all proportional taxes have the same concentration of 
the tax base, so that the correct definition of tax size seems not really of interest when computing the 
Kakwani. Instead, the concentration of the most redistributive tax depends on the size; therefore, the 
correct definition of the amount of resources employed is essential for the computation of the 
redistributive efficiency index.  
Unfortunately, in real tax benefit systems the definition of the size of taxes and benefits is not always an 
elementary task. There are several cases in which it is not easy to decide whether some tax credits are 
more appropriately classified as benefits. Typical examples are tax expenditures and negative taxes. Similar 
doubts arise about the benefits: a withdrawal rate on a benefit works like a tax surcharge on beneficiaries’ 
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market incomes. Indeed, Meade proposed a Citizen’s Income plus a “Withdrawal Surcharge over the lower 
range of [...] income” (Meade, 1995, p. 69), instead of a minimum income. Though a minimum income and 
a basic income plus an additional tax on lower market incomes are the same, they may look very different 
as far as the computation of both redistributive efficiency and progressivity are concerned. According to 
nominal definitions, the first is just a benefit; the second is a benefit (with more resources employed, a 
lower efficiency and a lower progressivity than minimum income) plus an explicitly regressive tax. 
According to the nominal definitions, the same redistribution will result from different size and different 
progressivity for the two instruments, because they are treated as different, though they are essentially the 
same. In fact, as long as taxes and benefits are considered separately, conclusions will inevitably be 
affected by a certain degree of uncertainty due to the decisions we have to make on whether a tax is 
actually a benefit reduction or whether a tax relief is a benefit in disguise. Only the use of the concept of 
net fiscal system allows resolving the ambiguity inherent in the definition of taxes and benefits. The net tax 
incidence is (1.5) the difference between the taxes paid and the benefits received by each individual. For a 
person, net tax can have a positive or a negative value. A positive value (the taxes paid are bigger than the 
benefits received) means that she is a net payer to the government, while a negative value means that he is 
a net recipient. I have already shown that it is not possible to compute the concentration index of net tax; it 
is necessary to deal with quantities that assume either positive (taxes) or negative (benefits) values. Hence I 
define individual Net Tax (TNk) and Net Benefit (BNk) rather than individual Net fiscal system as such: 
 
2.6.a TNk = Tk – Bk  if  Tk >Bk TNk = 0  otherwise 
2.6.b BNk = Bk – Tk  if  Tk <Bk BNk = 0  otherwise 
 
The definition of individual net tax and benefit allows the computation of total amount of Net tax and Net 
benefit. Consequently, it is possible to simulate the most redistributive net fiscal system and to calculate 
the redistributive efficiency index of total tax-benefit system:  
 
2.7 𝑁
𝐸 =  
𝑁
𝑅𝑆
𝑀𝑅𝑁
𝑅𝑆        0 ≤ 𝑁
𝐸 ≤ 1 
 
Note that TNK and BNK are smaller than actual taxes or benefits for individuals who receive benefits and pay 
taxes because 2.6.a and 2.6.b imply that all benefits received by net payers are treated as tax reliefs and 
that all taxes payed by net receivers are treated as benefit reductions. As a consequence, if at least one 
individual pays taxes and receives benefits, the values of total net tax (TN) and total net benefit (BN) used 
to compute the most redistributive net tax and the most redistributive net benefit are smaller than 
budgetary total taxes and total benefits. 
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3. REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFICIENCY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
This section is devoted to the analysis of Redistributive Efficiency and Progressivity in 27 European 
countries. First, 𝑅𝐸 will be computed for taxes and benefits separately, so that Redistributive Efficiency 
can be compared with the Kakwani index. Then the Redistributive Efficiency index will be calculated for the 
net fiscal systems, namely considering taxes and benefits together. 
 
 
Data 
 
The following analysis is based on data provided by the Euromod model, version G1.0+. Euromod is a tax-
benefit microsimulation model for the European Union; a clear and complete description of the model can 
be found in Sutherland and Figari (2013). The baselines used here refer to 2012 incomes and tax-benefit 
systems. Euromod simulations are based on individual data derived from EU-SILC survey for most countries; 
for some other countries input data are from national household budget surveys or national SILC. Also, the 
year of data collection differs among considered countries. Input data are described in Appendix 2. 
 
 
Equations and income definitions 
 
Euromod provides household disposable income by components. Market income includes income from 
labour (net of employer social contributions), incomes from capital and other market incomes. Tax includes 
income tax, property tax and local tax; indirect taxes are not included. Euromod includes all benefits in cash 
(many simulated, some from input data), but not benefits in kind (such as public health services and 
education). Household disposable income is equal to market income minus taxes and employee social 
contributions plus cash benefits. The empirical analysis will be carried out on household equivalent incomes 
obtained using OECD modified equivalence scale8. 
In the following taxes and employees social contributions will be always considered together and, for sake 
of simplicity, called just “taxes.” Unlike other important previous studies (OECD, 2008; OECD, 2011; 
Immervoll and Richardson, 2011), public old age and survivor pensions will not be included in the following 
analysis. This is not to say that pensions do not cause redistribution, but it is just the recognition that the 
analytical scheme adopted here does not allow its evaluation. Evaluating the redistributive impact of taxes 
and benefits involves the implicit calculation of counterfactual scenarios. What if taxes and benefits were 
not provided by the state? The implicit answer here is that in the absence of state intervention the 
provision of benefits and tax revenue would be negligible. That is a rather reasonable assumption for most 
benefits and taxes; economic theory suggests that benefits would be severely under-provided in a market 
economy and common sense suggests that very few people would pay taxes if not obliged. Indeed, even 
the most aggressive opponents of this type of static analysis advocate for the introduction of second order 
efficiency effects (such as the impact on labour supply) in the counterfactual scenario, but not for 
considering substitutive private provision of taxes and benefits.  
Things are different for old-age pensions, though. There is unquestionable evidence that all societies 
provide for some old age provisions, through private pension schemes, savings or household arrangements, 
                                                          
8 OECD modified equivalence scale gives value 1 for the first adult in the household, 0.5 for each additional adult and 0.3 for each 
child. Every individual aged below 14 is considered a child. 
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regardless of state intervention. Public pensions are compulsory saving/insurance systems that are bound 
to crowd out private provisions for old age to some extent. The construction of a counterfactual with such 
substitutive private provisions would be necessary for a thorough evaluation of the redistributive impact of 
public pension schemes.  
 
 
Reranking 
 
For this final empirical analysis we must give up the assumption of absence of re-ranking because in real 
tax-benefit systems the presence of reranking is inevitable even if marginal nominal tax rates are lower 
than 100%. Reranking is generally due to the treatment of households different in non-income 
characteristics (such as the number of components or presence of dependents) or to a non-homogenous 
treatment of different income sources9. In order to be able to take in account the presence of reranking a 
few changes in equations are necessary.  
For taxes, Reynolds-Smolensky decomposition (equation 1.2) changes into: 
  
3.1.  𝑇
𝑅𝑆= (𝐺𝑌+𝑇  − 𝐺𝑌) = (𝐺𝑌+𝑇  − 𝐶𝑌) −  𝑅𝐾𝑇  = (
𝑡
(1−𝑡)
)*𝑇
𝐾 −  𝑅𝐾𝑇 
 
Where 𝐺𝑌 and 𝐶𝑌 are, respectively, the Gini index and the concentration index of disposable income, 𝐺𝑌+𝑇  
is Gini index of income before taxes. The ordering variable is disposable income plus taxes. Re-ranking 
effect 𝑅𝐾𝑇  is the difference between Gini and concentration index of disposable income:  
 
𝑅𝐾𝑇  = (𝐺𝑌 − 𝐶𝑌) 
 
Similarly to equations 3.1, the Reynolds-Smolensky decomposition for benefits (equation 1.2b) changes 
into: 
 
3.2.  𝐵
𝑅𝑆= (𝐺𝑌−𝐵 − 𝐺𝑌) = (𝐺𝑌−𝐵  − 𝐶𝑌) −  𝑅𝐾𝐵  = (
−𝑏
(1+𝑏)
)*𝐵
𝐾 −  𝑅𝐾𝐵 
 
Where 𝐺𝑌 and 𝐶𝑌 are, respectively, the Gini index and the concentration index of disposable income, 𝐺𝑌−𝐵 
is Gini index of disposable income net of benefits. Re-ranking effect 𝑅𝐾𝐵  is the difference between Gini 
and the concentration index of disposable income. Disposable income minus benefits is the ordering 
variable for concentration indices. 
Finally, also equation 2.310 has to be changed into: 
 
3.3 𝑇
𝐸 =  
𝑇
𝑅𝑆
𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆 =  
𝑇
𝐾
𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝐾  −  
𝑅𝐾𝑇
𝑀𝑅𝑇
𝑅𝑆        
 
 
  
                                                          
9 For reranking due to vertical and horizontal inequity see Lambert 2001 pg.238. 
10 The equivalent equation for benefits is 𝐵
𝐸 =  
𝐵
𝑅𝑆
𝑀𝑅𝐵
𝑅𝑆 =  
𝐵
𝐾
𝑀𝑅𝐵
𝐾  −  
𝑅𝐾𝐵
𝑀𝑅𝐵
𝑅𝑆        
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Results 
 
This simple empirical analysis was first carried out on taxes and then on benefits separately to highlight 
similarities and differences between the Redistributive Efficiency index and the Kakwani index. Finally 𝐸  
was computed for the entire tax-benefit system, that is on net fiscal systems. 
Fig. 2 shows the Kakwani index (K-left hand scale), the Redistributive efficiency index (R-E- left hand scale), 
the Reynold-Smolensky index (R-S – right hand scale) and average tax rate (t– right hand scale) for taxes. 
Part a) and part b) contain the same variables, but in the first all countries are ordered by the Kakwani, 
while in the latter countries are ordered by Redistributive Efficiency; this will allow the robustness of 
previous findings on the relation between Kakwani index and average tax rate to be tested. Verbist and 
Figari (2014) found a negative correlation between progressivity as departure from proportionality and the 
level of tax burden. They conclude that tax rate and progressivity are “rather substitutes than 
complements” and that it “confirms the different policy options adopted by governments across Europe 
even when the policy aim in terms of redistribution is the same.” 
Both part a) and b) show that 𝐸    and 𝐾  differ significantly. As expected, the discrepancies between the 
two indices appear to be clearly explained by average tax rate level.  
Fig. 2a confirms the negative correlation between the Kakwani index and tax level. Yet, the correlation 
disappears if Redistributive Efficiency is used instead of Progressivity as Departure from Proportionality 
(Fig. 2b). This contradictory evidence leaves room for further investigations on the role played by the 
reduction of the upper limit of the Kakwani as the average tax rate increases. Previous results seem to 
depend on the technical dependence of effective Kakwani upper limit on tax size, rather than alternative 
policy strategies adopted by European governments with similar attitude toward redistribution. 
 
Fig. 2: Taxes and social contribution 
 
a-Ordered by kawani index 
 
 
 
b- Ordered by Redistributive Efficiency index 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 shows the Kakwani index (K), the Redistributive Efficiency index (R-E) and the Reynolds-Smolesnsky 
(R-S) index for benefits. Part a) and part b) contain the same variables, but countries are ordered 
differently: in part a) countries are ordered by decreasing Kakwani index and in part b) they are ordered 
according to Redistributive Efficiency index. In case of benefits I will analyse the issue on whether countries 
with transfers more targeted to the poor do distribute more than other countries.  
 v 
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The debate was opened by Korpi and Palme (1998), who found that “The more we target benefits at the 
poor and the more concerned we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely 
we are to reduce poverty and inequality”. They call their findings the “paradox of redistribution”. 
 
Fig. 3: Benefits 
 
a-Ordered by kawani index 
 
 
 
 
b- Ordered by Redistributive Efficiency index 
 
 
 
 
Korpi and Palme’s (1998) conclusions were largely based on the positive relation between the 
concentration index of benefits and redistribution11 found in the countries they considered, although their 
discussion about differences among welfare systems was far more articulated. Their findings imply that 
welfare models more targeted on the poor are able to devote a much lower amount of resources to social 
expenditure. It has to be noted that a negative relation between the concentration index of the benefits 
and the amount of resources in not sufficient, per se, to cause the fall of redistribution as the concentration 
of benefits increases. 
In Fig. 3 the Kakwani is presented with the sign changed, in order to make clearer the two pictures. The 
Redistribution index (Reynold-Smolensky) seems to decrease as the Kakwani index decreases (fig.3a). This 
confirms more recent results obtained by Marx et al. (2013), who found that the redistributive paradox 
does not hold any more. The positive correlation between targeting transfers to the poor and redistribution 
is even more apparent (Fig. 3b) if we use the Redistributive Efficiency index as the measure of the targeting. 
Looking at the Kakwani of taxes and benefits does not provide any hints on progressivity of the whole net 
fiscal system. We have already seen how taking into account the overlapping of taxes and benefits over the 
same individuals is important for a correct evaluation of the impact of the whole tax-benefit system. Even 
neglecting this issue, the comparison of Fig. 2 to Fig. 3 highlights that countries with very progressive taxes 
(such as Portugal and Ireland) often do not have very regressive benefits; therefore, it is impossible to 
guess how much the whole tax-benefit system is targeted to the poor. The Redistributive Efficiency index is 
the only tool that enables to such an evaluation.  
Fig.4 shows the Redistributive Efficiency (right hand scale), the Reynolds-Smolensky (left hand scale) and 
the Maximum Redistribution (
𝑀𝑅
𝑅𝑆   - left hand scale) indices for net fiscal system. Countries are ordered by 
Reynolds-Smolensky. 
                                                          
11 If benefits are mainly targeted to the poor, the concentration index is negative and its value increases (decrease in absolute 
value) as the share of benefits received by the poor decreases. Concentration index is positive if a disproportionate share of 
benefits is given to the rich. Korpi and Palme (1998) measure redistribution as the percentage change of gini index of income 
caused by benefits. 
v 
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Fig. 4 Net fiscal systems 
 
 
 
A clear pattern of redistribution and Redistributive Efficiency emerges from the picture. The two Anglo-
Saxon countries (UK and Ireland) present a very high level of redistribution and redistributive efficiency. 
Then, there is a large group with average levels of redistribution; the Reynolds-Smolenky index lies 
between 12.5 and 7 points for as many as 15 countries. Some of these countries obtain their redistributive 
impact with higher Redistributive Efficiency and others with higher Maximum Redistribution, without a 
clear pattern. Finally there are ten countries with very low levels of redistribution, below 7 points. 
Interestingly, all of them show a poor Redistributive Efficiency (except Slovakia) while the Maximum 
Redistribution varies significantly; a few of them, notably Italy and Poland, have a maximum redistribution 
index even bigger than some countries belonging to the average redistribution group. As it emerges, low 
Redistributive Efficiency plays an important role in explaining the poor redistributive impact of the 
underperforming tax-benefit systems. 
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Appendix 1 
 
B1 and B2 are two minimum income schemes: 
B1(𝑥) = b1 - 𝑥  if 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏1;   0  otherwise 
B2(𝑥)  = b2 - 𝑥   if 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏2;   0  otherwise 
Where 𝑥 is income before benefits.  
If 𝑏1 < 𝑏2,  B1(𝑥) involves a smaller amount of resources than B2(𝑥) 
 
To be equalizing, benefits have to be regressive. A sufficient condition for B1(𝑥) to be more regressive 
than B2(𝑥) is that Lorenz curve of B1 (𝐿𝐵1(𝑥)) dominates Lorenz curve of B2 ( 𝐿𝐵2(𝑥)). 
This condition is not strictly true because 𝐿𝐵1(𝑥) =  𝐿𝐵2(𝑥) = 1  if 𝑥 > b2.  
The condition can be restated so that B1(𝑥)is more regressive than B2(𝑥) if Lorenz dominance holds 
when 𝑥 is smaller than b2. 
 
A.1 B1(𝑥)is more regressive than B2(𝑥) if : 
𝐿𝐵1(𝑥) >  𝐿𝐵2(𝑥)       If 𝑥< b2   
𝐿𝐵1(𝑥) =  𝐿𝐵2(𝑥) = 1      Otherwise 
 
Condition 𝐿𝐵1(𝑥) >  𝐿𝐵2(𝑥)  is clearly true if b1 ≤  𝑥 ≤ b2, since 1 = 𝐿𝐵1(𝑥) >  𝐿𝐵2(𝑥) < 1. 
Hence it remains to prove that: 
 
A.2   𝐿𝐵1(𝑥) >  𝐿𝐵2(𝑥)      if  𝑥 < b1. 
 
Condition A.2 is similar to the “qualified Lorenz dominance” used by Keen et al. 2000. 
I show that this is true for any value of income smaller than 𝑏1 
Consider any distribution 𝑋 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2) where: 𝑥1 < 𝑥2 < 𝑏1:  
 
B1(𝑥1) = b1 - 𝑥1 
B2(𝑥1) = b2 - 𝑥1 
 
𝐿𝐵1(𝑥1) = 
𝑏1−𝑥1
(𝑏1−𝑥1)+(𝑏1−𝑥2)
 
 
𝐿𝐵2(𝑥1) = 
𝑏2−𝑥1
(𝑏2−𝑥1)+(𝑏2−𝑥2)
 
 
Then condition A.2.  implies: 
 
𝑏1 − 𝑥1
(𝑏1 − 𝑥1) + (𝑏1 − 𝑥2)
 >  
𝑏2 − 𝑥1
(𝑏2 − 𝑥1) + (𝑏2 − 𝑥2)
 ⇒ 
 
0 > (𝑏1 − 𝑏2)(𝑥2 − 𝑥1). ⇔ 𝑏1 < 𝑏2 
 
Hence B1(𝑥)  is more regressive of B2(𝑥)  if  b1 < b2, that is if total expenditure for B1 is lower than total 
expenditure for B2. 
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Appendix 2  
 
Euromod database  
 
Country code Input data Policy year 
    
Austria at EU-SILC 2008 2012 
Belgium be EU-SILC 2010 2012 
Bulgaria bg EU-SILC 2008 2012 
Cyprus cy EU-SILC 2008 2012 
Czech 
Republic 
cz EU-SILC 2008 (+ variables from 
national SILC) 
2012 
Denmark dk EU-SILC 2008 2012 
Estonia ee EU-SILC 2008 2012 
Finland fi EU-SILC 2008 2012 
France fr national data 2010 2012 
Germany de EU-SILC 2010 2012 
Greece el EU-SILC 2010 2012 
Hungary hu EU-SILC 2010 2012 
Ireland ie EU-SILC 2008 2012 
Italy it national SILC 2010 2012 
Latvia lv EU-SILC 2010 2012 
Lithuania lt EU-SILC 2010 (+ variables from 
national SILC) 
2012 
Luxembourg lu EU-SILC 2008 (+ variables from 
PSELL3) 
2012 
Malta mt EU-SILC 2009 2012 
Netherland nl EU-SILC 2008 2012 
Poland pl EU-SILC 2008 (+ variables from 
national surveys) 
2012 
Portugal pt EU-SILC 2008 2012 
Romania ro EU-SILC 2010 2012 
Slovakia sk national SILC 2010 2012 
Slovenia si EU-SILC 2010 (+ variables from 
national SILC) 
2012 
Spain es EU-SILC 2010 2012 
Sweden se EU-SILC 2008 2012 
United 
Kingdom 
uk Family Resources Survey 2008/9 2012 
 
Source: EUROMOD data documentation. 
 
 
